The fi ght against money laundering fi rst became institutionalized with the 1989 G7 meeting in Paris ( ' the Arch summit ' ) that saw the creation of the FATF. 1 In the 1990s, the scope of anti-money laundering regime 2 -which, at the start, had targeted only proceeds from the drug trade -was gradually extended in France to cover the fi nancial transactions of criminal organizations (1993) and fi nally all transactions tied to any illegal activity (1996), while professions involved and due diligence requirements were broadened. Three European directives (1991, 2001 and 2005) reinforced this development. Thus, today, all fi nancial transactions are under surveillance, and private sector fi nanciers, in particular bankers, play a prominent role. Responsible for identifying suspicious dealings within their institutions, they are required to communicate their fi ndings to a fi nancial intelligence unit -which name is Tracfi n, attached to the French Ministry of Financethat decides whether or not to notify the judicial authorities. The Banking Commission, meanwhile, requires that institutions be equipped with adequate means of control (personnel, operating procedures, equipment, etc.) and that the Board of Directors oversees their functioning. The steps taken in the fi ght against ' dirty money ' have thus extended the boundaries of policing 4 by systemizing the supervision of fi nancial transactions and by enlisting for the fi rst time actors in the private sector responsible for identifying suspect
equipment, and so on). We will fi rst present the professional background of the compliance offi cers who have been hired for this task in the banking sector since the early 1990s; then, we will investigate the factors that have contributed to homogenizing this new specialty. Secondly, the paper will underscore the diversity of banking procedures in the struggle against dirty money, by pointing to the room for manoeuvre implicit when it is a question of deciding important issues on a daily basis, of determining the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of measures taken, and fi nally of remaining in constant touch with outside sources of information, in particular sources within the law enforcement agencies. 7 
The Drive against Money Laundering: An Expertise in the Making
Professional specialization began in 1990 with the fi rst French law on money laundering. Some sectors of the banking world responded rather rapidly, taking steps in anticipation of the GAFI recommendations and the setting up of Tracfi n. Crédit Lyonnais initiated a ' unit for the prevention of fraud and money-laundering ' , headed by one of the founding fathers in the fi eld. Other institutions adopted similar measures (Hervet Bank, Crédit Mutuel) . In the beginning, emphasis was on anti-fraud policies designed to protect the bank against threats from the exterior. Mobilization spread through the mid-1990s: ' On one hand, many colleagues said they spent more and more time on fraud issues. On the other hand, the 1996 law made money-laundering an offence that could entail penal consequences for the banks considered as legal entities ' (COE 1). But these initiatives were few and far between and, when they did occur, were confi ned to senior management. Mobilization within the profession only became widespread in 2001 due to the combined effects of two events: the indictment of bankers (Société Générale) 8 and insurers (AXA) for complicity in money laundering, and the launching of renewed international mobilization concerning clandestine fi nancial transactions after 9/11.
The invention of an expertise at the crossroads of heterogeneous fi elds of competence
Anti-money laundering is located at the crossroads of several specialized areas which have been incorporated to varying degrees, depending on the organizations concerned. Banks must comply with a new set of mandatory norms in their choice of clients and the supervision of their fi nancial dealings. Put more bluntly, it is also a question of protecting senior bank management from criminal charges, which have disastrous consequences for both managers and the banks themselves. Yet, banks are called upon to identify ' proceeds of crime ' when all they can concretely observe are account transactions. The issue then for them is to develop criteria capable of identifying deviant dealings, in other words ' suspicious transactions ' (or, in some other jurisdictions, ' unusual ' transactions). In the beginning, the fi rst to enrol in the anti-money laundering fi ght came from 7 Research for this article has been supported by the ' Droit et Justice ' mission of the Ministry of Justice and by the Institut National des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité. 8 At the end of 2001, this bank, as a legal entity, and also some of its top managers were indicted for money laundering. The CEO was sent before the Paris criminal court in July 2006 for ' aggravated money-laundering ' . The bank was accused of deliberately not having taken adequate measures to put a stop to the circulation of fraudulent cheques between Israel and France six years before. Three other banks and more than 130 employees and managers were also referred to the court. Judgments for these cases are still expected. personnel within the bank, but, given the importance of the legal stakes and in particular the dangers inherent in the penal risks, other sources of expertise were sought by way of reinforcement, for the most part within the police or the judiciary. The heterogeneous character of this fi rst generation of money laundering specialists was clearly discerned by those involved: ' They were a bunch of top-echelon autodidacts: people with doctorates, former police commissioners, recycled bank managers … . It was a mixed world in terms of where people came from, their experience and their plans for the future. For some it was a choice by default ' (COE 22) .
Most of those within banks who are in charge of the money laundering fi ght come from the internal inspection branch, sometimes known as the ' conformité ' sector. Initially, compliance offi cers were those who saw to it that regulations within the institution itself were adhered to ( HLR 1996 ) . Before assuming this type of responsibility, they had for the most part served in a commercial capacity in client management, the setting up of credit and loan arrangements, or the analysis of credit risks. Thorough knowledge of the different aspects of the banking profession was considered a necessary precondition. Pioneers in the fi eld of money laundering control thought of themselves as inventors obliged to acquire on their own the basic tools of their trade: ' I drew on my professional experience, on reading the press, on suspicious activity reports, on Tracfi n progress reports and on other informal sources … I just eat up printed material ' (COE 14) . This do-it-yourself side has not entirely disappeared, despite the evolution towards greater homogeneity that we will discuss later; in this specialty, personal commitment remains a major incentive. One supervisor in the anti-money laundering department, who joined up in 1996, declared ' When I took the job, I knew next to nothing about the fi ght against money-laundering. It was a personal challenge, one in which I made good use of my background in risk management ' (COE 36). Another newly arrived manager bore him out: ' One can learn the theory, but to become an expert you have to develop a money-launderer's twisted mentality … . I could do with some practical training ' (CP 4).
Recruiting managers from the public sector (law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, a few tax inspectors) has been stimulating for those assigned from within the institution. Some banks had made a tradition of staffi ng intelligence services with former police offi cers; others had already established informal ties on a regular basis. One banker declared ' When I was an inspector, I took part in the judicial hearings, in the preparation of interrogation sessions and petitions addressed to investigating magistrates … . You have to rub shoulders with police offi cers and judges in the fi eld if you want to understand the fi ght against money-laundering ' (COE 1). But recruitment changed in terms of both scope and quality when the banks began to be indicted in the mid-1990s. 9 It is estimated today that during this upswing in recruitment, some 50 persons were integrated into senior management; and this does not take into account their decisive infl uence when they acted as initiators, occupying as they do today, top-level posts. The aim was often to react to a criminal indictment, as was the case with the Crédit Lyonnais -' In 1995 the president wanted someone to make a clean sweep; he wanted a top fl ight cop on his team ' (COE 14) -or to prevent it. ' The bank was worried about its antimoney-laundering setup. I thought it took a lot of nerve to go and fetch a cop in the fi nance police, and a well-known one at that ' (COE 39). The government departments specializing in fi nancial crimes (the prosecutor's department or the OCRGDF) were the foremost providers of these specialists. These recruitments served three functions. First of all, they constituted a gesture in terms of the law: banks thereby demonstrated their intention to obey the regulations in the course of their activities by resorting to ' guarantors of the law ' -outside experts versed in judicial matters and specialized in investigations.
10 Next, people with these sorts of CVs were sought after for their contacts, their personal networks and their access to otherwise unavailable information. Finally, they could prove useful in a crisis, by serving as a communication interface with police and justice offi cials so as to sound out just how far an investigation had gone and to prepare the bank's defence. A manager in charge of the anti-money laundering campaign whose bank had been implicated compared his situation to that of more fortunate colleagues: ' Other anti-money-laundering experts could contact the fi nancial division to know the details of the judicial case against them … . They could then immediately submit a report to Tracfi n and get rid of whoever was involved. In our case the requisition got lost in the judicial hierarchy and nothing was done … ' (COE 39). But middle-sized banks do not have the means to recruit such people and they consider that to do so is a sign of arrogance on the part of the major fi nancial groups. Several big banks have chosen not to recruit former police offi cials or magistrates, and boast of having trained their own personnel in anti-money laundering techniques.
Today, there is a dynamic at work, pushing towards hybridization, regardless of the specifi c backgrounds of those responsible for the anti-money laundering campaigns. ' In our case, it's a recent development, the result of 9/11. We're a mixed team formed around a precursor who for a long time had worked alone. It's the arrival of people with differing levels of skills that created the team. Soon we'll be need needing a computer analyst ' (COE 56). It is said that there are 1,000 bankers specialized in the anti-money laundering fi ght in France. Most of the procedures adopted combine techniques for keeping a close watch on clients and methods for investigating suspicious cases. Three lines of development have characterized the evolution of all of these institutions. First, the shift from the ' back offi ce ' to the ' front offi ce ' : anti-money laundering activities have become detached from general management and spread throughout the network so as to provide a new frame of reference for relations with clients. Next, the obligation to be informed about the client (KYC), 11 which used to be considered suspicion-mongering, has been redefi ned as standard commercial procedure, varying in the degree of sophistication, but with the aim of sizing up the client's situation and needs: ' … thorough knowledge of a client makes for good business ' (COE 36). Finally, techniques for automatic identifi cation and follow-up of fi nancial transactions have become standard. While the dramatic infl ux of former police inspectors and magistrates into the anti-money laundering sectors has served to render credible and effective the steps taken to curb money laundering (even in those institutions in which these ' guarantors of the law ' were not present), today, their specialization tends to be subsumed into broader-based procedures concerned with risk management ( Power 2004 ) . The way in which compliance offi cers now occupy an offi cial status within institutions is an indication of how these differing approaches have been joined together. ' Concern with risk control has had more of an impact than anti-money-laundering policy in the strict sense of the term. Moneylaundering is just one risk among others. Our approach to the matter is the same as when we are investigating other types of fraud ' (CP 7). A compliance bureau manager put it this way: ' I'm in touch with two intermediaries, a former police offi cer and a former magistrate. They check on the technical aspects of the case. But it's not up to them to make decisions; it's we, whose profession it is, to blow the whistle. No MBA will teach you that sort of thing. You have to have confi dence in your judgment and be ready to make decisions regardless of the commercial consequences ' (COE 19) .
This hybridization is refl ected in the professional career paths of those involved. M.D. ' s case can serve as an illustration: tax inspector and then tax auditor, he became a banker in 1989, then returned in 1999 to the Ministry of Finance to head an important administrative branch (which included Tracfi n), before being recruited in 2002 by an international bank, where he is in charge of the department responsible for supervising all aspects of the compliance programmes. While such transits back and forth are the exception, moving from the public sphere to the private sphere is increasingly frequent in banking institutions. Finally, the hybridization of professional competence can in large part be explained -above and beyond the juxtaposition of different fi elds of expertise -by the dynamics of homogenization.
Homogenization of the fi ght against money laundering
The confl uence of various forms of expertise into one well defi ned specialty has been precipitated by three major factors: training programmes, the creation of professional networks and the development of new technologies. It has resulted in the establishment of a core curriculum at the heart of the anti-money laundering struggle, consisting of the creation of new organizations and the elaboration of procedures and a set of functional norms -all of which denote a new form of specialization in the making, and, in some respects, a new profession.
Training programmes have played an essential role, not only by way of reassuring the pioneers in their newly acquired know-how, but also in the enlistment of newcomers. This has been one of the most tangible results of the anti-money laundering combat. ' When I was fi rst assigned to the job in 1995, I knew nothing of money-laundering. But I was knowledgeable about public relations and the banking world; I was ready to jump in and give it my best -and I was capable of training others. I drew up a guide to moneylaundering and fraud in 1999 … . Employees have to realize that this sort of thing can happen to them ' (COE 14). Another pioneer pointed out that he had to reassure the personnel: ' You have to explain that the anti-money-laundering fi ght isn't too hot to touch. I worked out the training tools myself, so as to adapt them to the operations divisions. You can convince people by explaining that anti-money-laundering is a commercial procedure, a quality criterion, a legal obligation ' (COE 1). From the mid-1990s onwards, in addition to in-house training, courses were offered by a number of organizations, in particular by a study and research unit attached to the Home Offi ce (Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure) and by the French banking professional body (Fédération Bancaire Française). All major establishments have by now trained the majority of their personnel and, in particular, the commercial managers in close contact with clients. This new requirement has led to the creation of specialized consultant fi rms, but the large accounting and consulting fi rms (PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Deloitte, KPMG, and Ernst & Young) have also invested in the market by proposing packaged services (diagnosis of procedures, recommendations, personnel training). It is often said that this sort of thing is mere window-dressing, designed to serve as an ' alibi ' in countering negative comments coming from the Banking Commission. A frequent criticism points to the split between the training process and what actually goes on in the fi eld. ' If what we are supposed to study are cases of money-laundering involving several million euros, then that's not the sort of thing you'll ever see here ' (COP 47). The impact on professionals in the fi eld can vary greatly. One instructor distinguished three different types of response: ' There are those who agree, but who are aware of the limits of the fi ght against money-laundering; those who don't accept the program, claiming that they're in business solely to run up profi ts; and those who consider that management has taken the easy way out, for it is impossible put into practice what they are asked to do. Those who work in the " private estate planning " sector or on the fl oor of the stock market often treated what I said as a big joke ' (COE 14) .
A number of newsletters with a limited circulation ( Money Laundering Alert or La Lettre du Blanchiment ) have also contributed to spreading information among the various actors by publicizing innovative professional initiatives and transmitting news of international norms. Finally, several networks have emerged out of think tanks bringing bankers and magistrates together such as the ' Sauton Club ' , now known as the Centre d'Etude du Blanchiment et de la Corruption (CEBC). There also exists a society of fi nancial auditors attached to the major banking concerns who meet in select groups to pool their experience. These networks are all the more important in that in France, there is no formal professional association of compliance offi cers; 12 they provide a sense of community that is an advantage in the fi ght against money laundering, as we will show in our second part. Lastly, the clubs formed by those who work with computergenerated detection techniques enrich exchanges within the network.
Engineering techniques play a decisive role in the homogenization of procedures and practices. The equipment required for anti-money laundering requires considerable investment on the part of banks: the setting-up and maintenance of computer systems designed to facilitate surveillance can run into millions of euros. 13 In the early years, technological innovation required major outlays; institutions acquired software programs or created their own surveillance systems: ' In our case we developed a system at a reasonable cost (300,000 euros), one that seemed to fi t our needs; other establishments bought Searchspace [a software system with parameters that searches for unusual/suspicious transaction types] and it cost them 2 to 3 million euros ' (COE 30).
Some computer systems serve to analyze initial contacts with clients; others follow up on transactions or analyze stock performance. More sophisticated software provides detailed background information on clients and account movements. These instruments have also set the criteria for defi ning undesirable clients or atypical fi nancial operations. ' The problem is that you have to be sure to target what you want to obtain, and adjust the parameters accordingly. You have to be careful not to be swamped by 12 As is the case in the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. In Switzerland, there exist two sets of compliance offi cers (French and German), organized as discussion forums on the basis of working teams. 13 There are two types of tools: the fi lters (lists of undesirable clients -identifi ed as drug dealers, or as persons in contact with terrorist milieux -politicians known to the public, and dubious fi nancial platforms) and the tools for account analysis (identifi cation of out-of-the-ordinary transactions). too many transactions or too many clients being fl agged down ' (COP 47). The software sets criteria by matching accounts by pairs or by tracing an evolution over time: ' An account is subject to surveillance for a year, and you check to see if the profi le remains the same or not. If the account profi le changes abruptly, it can be a sign of money-laundering ' (COE 30). Some people are sceptical as to the effi cacy of these instruments, particularly in regard to combating terrorism: ' In a period of two years we referred 20 cases to the Treasury … . For the most part they were minor screw-ups that had us worried for nothing. I was surprised; I thought we'd have more reports to send in ' (COE 29). Some practitioners emphasize the advantages provided by these techniques ( ' … it's a bit like Big Brother, you know everything about a client ' (COE 39)), echoing some analyses of the spreading of ' soft security ' , ' dataveillance ' and ' surveillance ' .
14 Others see them as a distortion of their true mission: ' I'm a bit disillusioned because we spend the better part of our time running computer projects. The idea of contributing to general interest goals is still there, but it remains in the wings ' (COE 28). It has thus been through training programmes, network exchange and the reliance on information technology that the homogenization of procedures has been accomplished.
In terms of structure, the organizations are similar. They consist of a command centre, linked to expert agents in each region and/or branch of activity, and fi nally contacts with all those responsible for noting any suspicious behaviour on the part of clients. Anti-money laundering is a centralized policy, for the number of people authorized to fi le reports of suspicious activity on the part of a client is strictly limited. These regimes have standard operating procedures involving knowledge of the clientele, the exploitation of computerized investigations, intelligence on dubious transactions, as well as criteria for fi ling charges and responses to judicial inquiries. They have likewise prompted the recruitment of specialized agents and considerable investment in training programmes and equipment.
The job has a certain appeal because of its ' glamour facet ' and ' investigation facet ' , but it is not always easy to fi nd suitable new recruits for a ' risky ' mission in which ' the control factor is seen as paramount. Candidates must show they understand that their job is to be of assistance, not pass judgment or get in the way of doing business ' (COE 36) . This is why some anti-money laundering managers think of themselves as headhunters: ' I picked them out one by one, always on the lookout for rigor, professionalism, honesty and transparency ' (COE 39). The make-up of the command centre depends on the senior manager's priorities. While sometimes it is a question of recruiting collaborators from within the network only, most observers agree on the necessity of ' complementary backgrounds and experience with professionals coming from policing departments and the law, or banks and accounting fi rms ' (COE 22).
Finally, these regimes are founded on the two pillars that form, so to speak, ' the core ' of the anti-money laundering vocation: risk control and professionalism. Prevention by risk management has become the leitmotif in the drive against money laundering. It refers to the prevention of fi nancial and commercial risks, but also penal risks and threats to a bank's reputation. ' You have to make managers aware of risks, make them understand that they are potential targets and that they can endanger their fi rm ' (COE 13). The best protection is not one that depends on after-the-fact control systems, but one which is an integral part of the way in which clients are handled and transactions followed up on. ' Prevention consists of helping establishments establish sounder arbitration, sticking as close as possible to legal requirements; it's also a way of raising the general level of awareness while preserving competitiveness ' (CP 6). This form of action combines knowledge of specifi c aspects of the law and a thorough familiarity with the banking profession. ' Getting involved in anti-moneylaundering activities -it was fascinating to us because of the investigative aspect and the contact with what went on beyond the law; if it's combined with the problem of internal control it can be most advantageous ' (CP 4). Anti-money laundering doctrine seeks to defi ne general principles that can be applied in equivocal circumstances. It must deal with the strain between the increasing number of exterior norms (GAFI, Tracfi n) and the diversity of clients ' concrete situation. Such a regime can also contribute to overall improvement in the quality of services offered. Certain establishments even consider the fi ght against money laundering as closely linked to the company's social responsibility. Yet, this conception of their function has two principal limits. First of all, putting it into operation is often impossible, ' because of the inadequacies of the evidence-gathering system (you have to go back to the initial illegal transaction to prove laundering), and second because of the time factor (cases sometimes go back 10 or 15 years). That's the weak spot ' (COE 13). In addition, there is the competition between establishments ' which often leads to schizophrenic decisionmaking. If my competitors are less keen on preventing money-laundering, it can be a negative thing for me ' (CP 13).
However, despite the discrepancies between theory and practice, and the omissions which managers themselves have called attention to, the latter often predict that increased professionalization will overcome these shortcomings: ' In the years to come we will be moving towards a more generalized model, that of the Anglo-Saxon compliance offi cers. You can't invent becoming a Tracfi n agent ' (COE 16). The hybridization of specialties and the homogenization of procedures which goes along with it can be seen as way of turning constraints into profi ts. In the early 1990s, the anti-money laundering fi ght was considered as an outside set of norms, threatening on account of their legal rigidity. Fifteen years later, it has found its place as a useful tool in client-handling procedures. In becoming part of the process, it has been domesticated and lost its initial penal aura. Yet, the tension inherent in the antimoney laundering fi ght between the commercial ethos and regulatory injunctions can, on the practical level, create dilemmas, especially when it comes to communicating information concerning dubious dealings and defi ning relations with the public regulatory agencies.
Delegating the Fight against Money laundering: How It Works in Practice
Despite these developments that have contributed to the homogenization of anti-money laundering, procedures vary between one banking establishment and the next, and vary also according to the background of the offi cer in charge and the priorities he fi xes for his mission. In this section, we will analyze how priorities in the anti-money laundering fi ght are defi ned within banking establishments, how they handle the problem of collecting and transmitting information concerning suspicious behaviour and, fi nally, how they envisage relations with the public regulatory agencies.
Reformulating internal priorities
In France, the nature and application of anti-money laundering measures in keeping with regulatory requirements have been a process handled within the banking establishments themselves. International consulting fi rms that usually provide such services make a point of commenting on this atypical situation in comparison with Anglo-Saxon countries: according to them, French banks are more reluctant to farm out activities such as training, e-learning, reorganizing the units, etc.: ' … in France, we prefer providing these services within the bank, even if it costs three times as much and is not effi cacious ' (CP 7).
There exist differing ways of fi tting anti-money laundering regimes into the bank's organizational structure. According to some observers, it is the disparity in the directors ' background and experience that determines what solution is chosen. ' Roughly speaking, today's anti-money-laundering manager concentrates his efforts either on the security end of things or the compliance aspect. The former is the case for ex police offi cials or magistrates, the latter for bankers ' (OPRO 2). The measures taken, however, tend to be complementary, prodded by the Banking Commission (Regulation no. 97 -02), 15 which comprises an inspection pole that audits accounts on an ongoing basis and a compliance pole, responsible for periodic investigations. It is this second pole, with a degree of autonomy that depends on the size of the establishment, that coordinates the anti-money laundering efforts, as well as ensuring adherence to a professional code of ethics and application of regulations set by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (somewhat similar to the US Securities and Exchange Commission or the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority).
Establishing these regimes has, on the one hand, served to homogenize the profession, but it has also left anti-money laundering managers with considerable leeway in defi ning their priorities. While all of them are engaged in the same sort of tasks -setting up an anti-money laundering command centre, training personnel, choosing adequate equipment, centralizing information on possible infractions, fi ling suspicious activity reports, handling relations with the regulatory bodies -they don't adopt exactly the same operating procedures, which can vary according to their conception of their mission. 16 The differences here, moreover, don't correspond exactly to the disparity in professional background and experience. It sometimes occurs that competing conceptions of what anti-money laundering priorities should be exist within a single department and even within a single person.
Yet, those whose career has been in the police, the judicial bodies or in banking inspection tend to emphasize the security aspects: ' My primary mission is to fi ght against money-laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism; it's a question of protecting my bank and its CEO from judicial prosecution. Period ' (COE 5). They see themselves as ' the president's safety fuses ' , prepared to be personally liable before the law ( ' … my boss is always reminding me of it ' ) which, in turn, ' entails negotiating fi nancial compensation ' (COP 50). They make a point of providing training for all those working in the bank, yet they remain sceptical as to the degree of commitment of ' sales personnel ' to fi ghting against dirty money: ' A sales representative, whatever his post, is not made of the same stuff as we are; he wants profi ts, and in fact he's paid on the basis of the profi ts he brings 15 Recently modifi ed (3 March 2005) . 16 On the development of secondary application rules, see Lascoumes (1990) . in! He's always going to treat anti-money-laundering as secondary … . Everyday in one of our French branches we open accounts that shouldn't be opened ' (COE 5). This scepticism results in greater reliance on information garnered from outside sources. ' We function like a central intelligence offi ce. We deal in economic intelligence and info exchange … ' (COE 1). Those who approach money laundering from this angle are often to be found in fi rms that have been obliged to engage in major reorganization as the result of a crisis (problems with the law, penalties handed down by the Banking Commission, etc.).
On the other hand, those anti-money laundering managers who have come up through the ranks within the bank have another attitude towards dirty money: they claim as their fi rst priority the defence of the bank network, the tellers and the branch directors with whom they identify. They refuse to see themselves as ' auxiliary scouts for police and judicial authorities ' (COE 22). Often inclined to defend the integrity of the ' sales representatives ' ( ' If they come face to face with a swindler you can be sure they're going to put a stop to it; they don't need anti-money-laundering procedures for that ' (COE 44)), they think of their own professional experience as their major qualifi cation for the job. They make much of their ' communication skills ' with sales people and clients and of ' knowing how to distinguish between what in theory you should require and what in fact you can require ' (COE 44). From this perspective, on-the-job training ( ' the key to the struggle ' ) and teaching people to be on the lookout become major attributes: ' When I fi rst arrived, I said to myself there were the two fundamentals: procedures and training. If you don't get those two objectives across, the rest is of no use ' (COE 58). ' Police agents ' are seen as a race apart: ' Once a cop, always a cop even when he's a banker; he tends to short circuit Tracfi n and take things up directly with former colleagues ' (COE 5); they can sometimes serve a useful function in the case of ' external investigations or fi shing for leads ' (COE 44), but they're not essential for anti-money laundering: ' … if we do our job properly, the sources we need are to be found within the bank ' (COE 10). Scepticism in regard to those issued from the ranks of the police also holds true for banks specialized in private estate management where clients are the fi rst priority ( ' … we're not money-laundering ayatollahs ' (COE 33)). The degree to which these two approaches mesh accounts for the wide variations in the way the fi ght against money laundering is waged.
The dilemmas of fi xing internal banking procedures
All those we interviewed stressed, with varying degrees of emphasis, the limits of banks ' awareness of the fi ght against money laundering, despite the importance these establishments have given to training programmes. Some have commented on the ' objective ' technical diffi culties inherent in the task. ' We always think of the terrorists as numbskulls that are easy to identify, but it's not the case ' (COE 34). Most interviewees stressed the fact that some Money-Laundering Reporting Offi cers (MLROs) put on a big show, constantly sending in ' phony reports ' : ' If an account emits so much as a shiver, they fi le a report and then take no further responsibility. They open the umbrella! That's what they've retained from their training: " You want to stay out of trouble? Then fi le a report " ' (COP 46). This new dependence on formalities that is frequently criticized refl ects bank tellers ' desire for a totally automatic detection system that would obviate the need for individual decision making ' as if anti-money-laundering were limited to monitoring the amount of cash transactions ' . The question of the legal responsibility of staff can thus become an issue for the institution's trade unions, who call for ' greater clarifi cation of the rules of the game for the staff who are on the front line ' (COE 10).
When confronted by such abuses, the degree of authority that the anti-money laundering manager wields can vary. Some establishments appear reticent to penalize staff for neglecting their duties in money laundering affairs ( ' It's diffi cult to apply in-house penalties ' (COE 58)); at most, they talk of ' awareness memoranda ' or of the effect on collaborators ' merit ratings. Others are only too glad to have recourse to sanctions: ' We were obliged to send off some thirty letters condemning unsatisfactory performance and fi re forty-fi ve agency managers: it's the sort of thing that has people sit up and take notice … ' (COE). News of penalties ' spreads like wildfi re ' , which ' helps get the message across ' . Anti-money laundering offi cers consider as a general rule that their authority depends on the relations that they cultivate with the bank's senior management and on the support that they receive when it comes to arbitrating confl icts between the ' commercial interests ' and ' professional ethics ' . Some interviewees derived a certain pleasure from this position of power, situated on a level above commercial activities: ' The operations departments, I really shook them up! When I turned something down it went right to the top for a decision, the president or senior management, that's how important it was … . As for me, it didn't bother me in the least to say what was on my mind to those gnomes in Corporate and Investment Banking [ … ] . We torpedoed deals that ran into astronomical fi gures, but you have to choose what side you're on. It's not our job to close deals with gangsters! ' (COE 39). The authority that they seek is not only over the ' commercial representatives ' , but over the bank directors as well. They sometimes claim the power of dissuasion based on the threat of penal risks, which allows them to force their opinions on directors: ' … we're the power in this fi rm; you can't get around us. If ever the president doesn't agree with one of our decisions I get him to put it in writing ' (COP 50).
The vast amounts of information processed by anti-money laundering units are derived from numerous sources. In addition to the notifi cations of suspicious activity transmitted by agents, there are, fi rst of all, the warnings coming in from computergenerated inquests, although these are often considered of little relevance. Those who are in a position to gather intelligence from outside contacts reinforce their status by giving greater importance to these sources. As a former commissioner put it, ' the most interesting SARs (Suspicious Activity Reports) don't come up from the lower echelons but directly from us or from the outside. When you come from where I come from, you've got an inbred sense of intelligence gathering. We're not in an ivory tower; people out there provide us with information. We get there faster! ' (COE 39).
Banks also differ in terms of the number of reports that they fi le with Tracfi n. The number is, in general, fairly low (at most, a few hundred a year), which is not much compared with the number of cases handled by the anti-money laundering departments (roughly one in 10,000). Most establishments do not set out to limit the number of reports fi led: ' As soon as we suspect something, we fi le a report. Filing a report's no longer a problem; it's a routine professional activity ' (COE 47). At the same time, they are aware that it is an accepted convention not to fi le too often: ' We took over a bank that was known as a fi scal washing machine. The Banking Commission's fi rst inspection was highly critical. As a result we declared everything: 15 times as many cases, the number of SARs multiplied by ten … , but what does that prove? The more SARs, the more rotten the bank? It's no simple matter to gauge what is effective ' (COE 22). Tracfi n wants only a limited number of reports fi led -only those that are well documented. As a result, some managers have deliberately chosen a restrictive policy, based on a high opinion of their own effi cacy: ' Anti-money-laundering? The better it works, the fewer reports. Before I took over, they fi led a lot. I divided the number of SARs by ten. We have a high level of market activity, but we represent only 0.4% of Tracfi n's cases. We act only on infractions of monetary and fi nancial laws: drugs, organized crime, corruption, fraud involving the public interest: all the rest, in particular tax evasion, we don't report. But I have a 40% feedback rate from Tracfi n on the cases I do declare, whereas Tracfi n considers 8% to be a respectable average ' (COE 39). Aside from the fanfare, the statement indicates that the leeway accorded to compliance offi cers includes even the delimitation of their fi eld of competence and the defi nition of what constitutes effective anti-money laundering within their establishment.
Tax fraud is one of the principal sources of tension in banks ' handling of the antimoney laundering fi ght. It points to the fact that there exist different ways of treating transgressions, determined according to their degree of unlawfulness in the eyes of antimoney laundering managers. While everyone is agreed on the necessity of contributing to the struggle against the ' indisputable plagues ' of drug traffi cking, organized crime and terrorism, they are by no means agreed on cooperating in crackdowns on ' everyday ' tax evasion or ' small-scale ' misappropriation of funds. ' It's just not possible to get agents to report the corner store manager's tax evasion ' (OPR 2). Commercial representatives have to ascertain what sort of an offence underlies a suspect account dealing and come to a decision on this basis: ' Sometimes you have a hard time understanding what's going on behind a fi nancial arrangement. Our objective is to separate the wheat from the chaff and determine which cases are simply tax evasion and which point to something murkier ' (COE 43). For these offi cials, it is a constant concern: ' We don't appreciate these kinds of cases; they create problems for us, for if they succeed it's thanks to us ' (COE 44). Bankers are not the only ones to think this way; even regulators encourage this attitude, as one of them emphasized: ' … anti-money-laundering must concentrate on serious transgressions and not on small-scale tax evasion. It's not our job to keep tabs on the local baker ' (REG 11).
This tension, which contributes in great measure to the high volume of suspicion reports that are dropped, was aggravated by the third European directive of 2005, which stipulated that anti-money laundering reporting must include all those infractions punishable by more than a year in prison, including tax fraud. Those we interviewed declared their decided opposition to this measure: ' … we're not tax inspectors; we're not there to fi ll out our clients ' wealth tax declarations! ' (COE 34). They considered that it ran the danger of ' swamping ' the anti-money laundering procedures, that it was ' liberticidal ' and unrealistic: ' … if they set disclosure thresholds, they'll be a lot laughs here. Given our type of client, it's not storekeepers ' fraud! Paying less taxes, that's our everyday business ' (COE 58). Several interviewees called for a distinction between ' two levels of fi scal fraud ' , in terms of the seriousness of the offence committed. There is consensus among compliance offi cers to include as part of their mission procedures designed to differentiate between varying degrees of illegality, but there remains great uncertainty as to how to draw the line between criminality and dealings that are unlawful but considered legitimate.
Does treating money laundering operations in terms of what is thought to be the type of transgression covered up end by giving undue importance to certain specifi c types of transgressions? That would seem to be what several interlocutors suggested, who considered that anti-money laundering campaigns managed to catch only ' small-time crooks ' -those incapable of outwitting the detection mechanisms set up. The emphasis on producing results means that those that are the least protected are the fi rst to be caught: ' … people don't give a damn about what the anti-money-laundering fi ght actually turns up. Concretely what you fi nd are small-time dealers that you wouldn't want as clients anyway. It serves to identify them and clear them off the books ' (COE 29). Adopting this kind of a policy depends, however, on the pressure exercised by their counterparts in the regulatory agencies: ' … my fi rst contact within Tracfi n was focused on small deals (small-time drug affairs); we sent him many of them, but the next contact only wanted big deals, over 150,000 euros and with media coverage ' (COE 56). Nevertheless, the majority of the compliance offi cers agreed that it was useless to fi le suspicious activity reports of under 50,000 euros, ' except if it required no effort on our part ' , for Tracfi n ' didn't even bother to look at them ' .
The fi nal dilemma having to do with suspicious activity reports concerns the question of closing out the account. As one compliance offi cer puts it, ' When you fi le a suspicious activity report, should the bank close the account? Tracfi n says no, so as to give them a chance to follow up on the case, but some bankers who hadn't closed accounts were indicted by judges ' (COE 5). Anti-money laundering managers complain of the regulators ' inconsistencies in this respect. As a general rule, they choose to close the account, since maintaining relations with a dubious client is ' too much of a hassle ' , but they point out that such costly decisions aren't always a solution because ' it's not an easy thing to close out a client who has a credit line with the bank, a savings and loan account, and life insurance ' (COP 46).
In sum, the fi ght against money laundering can appear as a powerful constraint, the legitimacy of which is open to discussion, which confi rms what was shown by Martin Gill and Geoff Taylor about the UK case ( Gill and Taylor 2004 ) . Most anti-money laundering managers subscribe to the objective of fi ghting against organized crime and terrorism, but they consider themselves fi rst and foremost as sentinels, responsible for warning senior management and/or bank personnel of the legal dangers that they run. Forced to invest massively in means of detection, banking establishments try to draw ' commercial advantages ' from the procedures that they have been obliged to set up, in particular when it is a question of information concerning their clientele: ' … the KYC regime has evolved into a set of precautionary measures involving reassessment of client accounts; we have thus profi ted from the regulatory requirements ' (COE 36). The way in which priorities are defi ned in the fi ght against dirty money has, in addition, determined the sort of relations entertained by compliance offi cers with regulators and with their colleagues in other banking networks.
New public -private relations and joint surveillance
The banks ' principal contacts are with the Banking Commission, Tracfi n and the specialized police and justice departments. The large-scale networks must, however, also take into account American legislation and sometimes deal with US regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Reserve Bank that functions ' more or less like certifi cation agency ' . Being defi ned as breaking American law can result in the closing of subsidiaries in the United States, reduced access to pension funds, as well as loss of international clientele.
The Banking Commission is an institution whose investigations and penalties are much feared and leaves banks with little room for negotiation. The Commission's requisites have become increasingly stringent since the late 1990s; according to one inspector, even though it is true that the banks had already begun at that point to act as ' informers on their clients ' , it was no longer possible to rely solely on their ' spontaneous participation ' (REF 37) . The anti-money laundering campaign was no longer to be ' a secondary nuisance that banks took care of when they had the time ' . Periodic investigations took place devoted entirely to the anti-money laundering effort; today, four or fi ve inspectors are assigned exclusively to such missions. They make sure that the measures that have been adopted function correctly: ' … we're not police offi cers and we're not big game hunters, but you can't close you eyes when there's an elephant in front of you ' (REG 37). The Banking Commission has since then imposed tough fi nes which were particularly hard on six banking establishments. In addition, measures providing for permanent surveillance have been developed; starting in 2000, banks have been required to reply to a ' questionnaire concerning the anti-money-laundering drive ' (QLB, Questionnaire sur la Lutte Antiblanchiment). According to one inspector, the purpose of this formality is to ' get senior management involved ' , since they must sign the questionnaire. Preparing the reply to the QLB is one of the principal ingredients of a bank's anti-money laundering programme.
Tracfi n has frequently been criticized as being understaffed and incompetent: ' When you consider what we spend for anti-money-laundering, we have a grudge against the administration. My collaborators and I, we're often frustrated: you send hard-and-fast cases to Tracfi n, superb fi les on terrorism fi nancing, and nothing happens ' (COE 58). On the other side, the managers of the ' fi nancial intelligence cells ' emphasize that theirs is one of the few sectors to hire additional personnel: the staff should go from 50 to 70 agents in 2007. They admit, however, that their department's appeal is often linked to the opportunities it offers for moving on to new professional milieux (the private sector, international organizations), which results in a high turnover. They condemn moreover the sham of bankers ' commitment to anti-money laundering; the latter's immediate reaction of defending the institution is no substitute for a well argued opinion: ' … they are all for automatic report-fi ling and black lists since they're interested in avoiding responsibility for their decisions ' (REG 9). In 2006, Tracfi n received 12,000 suspicious activity reports and, after further investigation, handed over roughly 400 cases to the judicial authorities. The compliance offi cers don't deny the existence of these ' umbrellareports ' , but account for them by the diffi culty in respecting the contradictory rulings issued on the one hand by Tracfi n that favours a selective approach and on the other hand by the Banking Commission that encourages transmitting everything. To solve the dilemma, Tracfi n has proposed, in the course of informal meetings with banks, to agree on a code that would distinguish between ' genuine suspicions ' and ' reports that are only formalities to ward off the Banking Commission ' (REG 40). Moreover, they have called on the regional compliance offi cers to develop personal relationships with their correspondents in Tracfi n: ' … you should meet them on a regular basis, discuss things, let them know the kind of problems you're up against ' ; ' … an investigative agent will never say " fi le a report " or " don't fi le " ; but he can answer questions and clarify the criminal aspects of the case. Afterwards it's up to the banker to decide ' (REG 40). In actual practice, the degree of informal relations with Tracfi n varies a good deal. Several interviewees said that they were in frequent contact with the institution and that they knew when one of their suspicious activity reports was transmitted to the judicial authorities, while others complained of the total absence of such relations. While most did not consider Tracfi n as a source of information concerning their clientele ( ' … you can sometimes get a reply out of them, but it doesn't come naturally ' ), others boasted of more uninhibited relations: ' … most of the time it's me that telephones them about one of my dossiers when I have diffi culty making up my mind. So-and-so, does the name mean anything to you? ' (COP 46).
Relations with police and judicial authorities leave the banks even greater leeway. These authorities do not fi gure explicitly in anti-money laundering regimes, except when it is a question of drawing up judicial charges.
17 Such charges are subjected to close scrutiny, both so as to protect the institution (so that it not be found at fault) and as a means of establishing contacts with the police departments. Once again, criticism of the understaffi ng and ineffi cacity of these institutions goes together with a desire to cultivate advantageous relationships with the agents in question. Some anti-money laundering managers base their reputation within the bank on their ability to maintain these contacts; others, as we have seen, consider such behaviour as a distortion of their mission. As a general rule, banking establishments try to develop access to police intelligence. While this sometimes fi gures as a factor in recruitment policy, most of those interviewed admitted that they cultivated ' unoffi cial relations with the Renseignements généraux [the domestic intelligence branch of the police] and with enforcement offi cers ' (COP 52) on a regular basis, through meetings and/or telephone calls. Interviewees saw this as a valuable assistance in ' getting background on some individual ' , ' clearing up misgivings ' , ' locating evidence ' or ' regaining confi dence when face to face with a bigtime dealer ' (COE 1). These relations then become part of an exchange of favours: ' I meet the criminal investigators stationed here twice a year. In addition when we have a problem, I get on the phone to them for information, even though we can't make use of the info afterwards. In exchange we provide details on accounts when they need it, even though their concern is not about money-laundering and they do neither have the right to make use of the info. Calls like this are put in several times a week, especially when it's a sleazy case … . Sometimes they'll say: " hold off sending in a report right away, we're going to track them down, give us 48 hours " , which puts us in a delicate situation ' (COP 50). Several interviewees admitted that they didn't expect to develop this kind of relationship. They depended on contacts established before their arrival between the bank and the policing departments: ' In the beginning I was most reluctant to get in touch with the police. It was a colleague who introduced me. I wasn't expecting contacts of that kind: one day the Direction de la surveillance du territoire [Internal state security department] called me, I didn't want to return the call. I was petrifi ed ' (COP 50). Others established their own contacts in the course of judicial inquiries.
The need for information in order to support suspicious activity reports has also led to an increase in informal exchanges of favours with colleagues in other banks. Antimoney laundering managers often boast of cooperating closely with their counterparts, getting away from the commercial competition of the banking world in which they move: ' … they're people who spend hours on the phone: " I've got this foul-up: what should I do? " " This guy, do you know anything about him? " . The milieu has an autonomous life, like a club, that transcends competition frontiers. They exchange info, intelligence ' 17 In other words, the requests for information that the judicial authorities send to the banks in the course of an investigation.
(COE 34). Organizing in this way is an alternative to establishing informal relations with the police: ' What really helps in this job it's having contacts with the different banking networks. I always work with my opposite number. I shouldn't be saying so, but that's what we do. I have contacts with other banking networks and it really works. If I have my doubts about an operation or about somebody, it's taken care of within the hour; for me that's what counts, it saves time and it's more effective ' (COP 47).
Conclusion
Implementing the fi ght against dirty money means adhering to a regime designed both to uphold a certain conception of public law and order (that calls for the commitment of the banking sector to combating criminality) and to protect these banking establishments through reducing a wide range of risks (regulatory infractions, penal sanctions, damage to image and reputation). 18 In France, as elsewhere, all establishments have invested large sums to recruit and train personnel, to set up new internal procedures and acquire expensive computer equipment specially tailored to the fi ght against money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. The willingness to cope with these issues by exploiting internal resources seems to be particularly high in France, if compared with the United States and the United Kingdom. First, there is no private fi rm providing certifi cation in the anti-money laundering fi eld and academic programmes are embryonic. Second, all interviewees working in Paris for the ' Big Four ' audit fi rms underlined the weakness of the demand for anti-money laundering services in the French market. Although hiring former policemen or judges has become normal in the leading French banks, the penetration of intelligence or law-enforcement agents in the private fi nancial sector is more recent and seems to be less developed than in the United States or in the United Kingdom. However, all French banks invest in software solutions providing transaction monitoring, watch list fi ltering and regulatory reporting: international leaders in the market of anti-money laundering technologies are as much in demand in France as elsewhere. When compared to the low level of fi nancing provided by government institutions (Tracfi n, OCRGDF, the fi nancial prosecutor's offi ce), these large-scale outlays make banks complain. The majority of the interviewed French compliance offi cers thought that delegating this responsibility constituted ' the ultimate alibi for governmental powerlessness ' (COE 34) or, in other words, ' a fi g-leaf for politicians who don't really intend to join in the fi ght ' (CP 27). They see themselves as the foremost contributors to the drive against dirty money, obliged to take on a job they consider as extraneous to their profession.
Yet, intent on avoiding increasingly stiff criminal penalties 19 for breaches in their security systems, these investments have become the material proof of bankers ' commitment to fulfi lling their new obligations and to handling risks competently. They serve as tangible evidence of the efforts undertaken. This view is confi rmed by Ericson's fi ndings that the handling of risk management was primarily directed to operational risks that could damage the organization's reputation. Banks thus adopt a defensive attitude, refl ected in the priority given to measures described as ' defendable compliance ' ( Ericson 2006 ) . This process results in the renewing of relations developed with actors in the public sector, in particular the policing world. Should one thereby conclude that compliance offi cers act as ' police auxiliaries ' , as a number of our interviewees claim, giving credence to the idea that theirs is an activity forced on them by the public authorities ( Ayling and Grabosky 2006 ) or that they are coopted by the police ( Levi and Wall 2004 ) ? It is by no means certain, for the police can just as well be considered as ' bank auxiliaries ' in that they provide information that can serve to protect the establishment from the regulators, in particular the Banking Commission. If, in our opinion, it is not of great interest to try to determine who comes off best in these exchanges, on the other hand, it is important to recognize that information exchange has become a routine procedure and led to the development of joint intelligence ' production ' . Such an interaction might be considered as a form of ' swap ' according to Grabosky's typology of security governance ( Grabosky 2004 ; see also Dupont 2007 ) , though the issues of the weak degree of constraint and the strong level of reciprocity between parties should be discussed in the French case, as the balance of power seems to advantage the public authorities. This paper, which only refl ects the French case, shows that since the early 1990s, the maintenance of close relations with the police, on a more or less formal basis, has become commonplace; now that it has been accepted, it is no longer seen as something secret, or even shameful, for a bank. By highlighting the way in which compliance offi cers work, we have shown that their activities have become closely intertwined with those of the policing authorities. The counterpart to the essential role played in fi nancial and economic policing by information coming from the private establishments ( Ericson and Haggerty 1997 ) is the opportunity for banking establishments to gain access to outside information -a fact which constitutes one of the raisons d ' être of compliance offi cers, to a greater or lesser degree -as determined by their professional career, their interpretation of their mission and the awareness their establishment displays of penal and other harm issues arising out of laundering.
